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The foundation of communication and action
in consciousness: Confronting action theory with
systems theoretical arguments
FRANK HUYSMANS
Abstract
In action theoretical approaches to the study of mass communication pro-
cesses, media production and reception activity is interpreted (or ‘ex-
plained’) from the point of view of individual consciousness. The intention-
ality of the actor is viewed as the starting point for human (social) action.
Communication is regarded as a process in which actors intentionally en-
gage to exchange their minds’ contents  and is therefore seen as a special
case of human action. This view is challenged by Luhmann’s social systems
theory, which conceives of communication as taking place outside of con-
sciousness. Although communication is a product of the mutual non-trans-
parency of individual consciousnesses, both consciousness and communica-
tion should be seen as self-reproducing systems which cannot interfere in
each other’s operations. According to Luhmann, thoughts cannot be com-
municated  only communications can be communicated, and thoughts
can merely be thought. Actions should be seen as the products of communi-
cation, namely of the attribution (be it through communication or through
thinking) of social descriptions to systems. Although it may appear to be
a fundamental issue, this difference in opinion between action and systems
theory can be made productive. In this article, arguments are presented for
incorporating Luhmann’s view of consciousness and communication as sepa-
rate, but mutually observing systems into action theoretical approaches.
Keywords: action theory, systems theory, action, communication, con-
sciousness, social action
The individualism of action theory and the collectivism of social theory
In an essay published in 1985, Jeffrey C. Alexander (1988) describes what
he calls the ‘individualist dilemma’ in phenomenological sociology and
symbolic interactionism. Both of these theoretical schools in sociology
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have opted for an individualist instead of a collectivist approach to the
problem of social order, i. e., how social order can exist given the fact
that people have more or less the same desires, the objects of these de-
sires are scarce and hence cannot be obtained by all. In stressing the
individual, creative moment in social action, explaining how social real-
ity can be relatively orderly becomes a problem. In individualist theory,
social life must be opened to contingency to such an extent that it, “in
the final analysis, makes the understanding of order approximate ran-
domness and complete unpredictability” (Alexander, 1988: 224). Since
most theorists of society will not be satisfied with such randomness,
Alexander posits that they will incorporate “some aspect of supraindivi-
dual pressure or sustenance” (224) in their conceptual schemes. But even
in doing so, these theorists are not willing to give up their individualist
presuppositions. The collectivist aspect of the theory, however, is not
part of the theoretical core; it is just ‘attached’ to it, and therefore
the collectivist reference will be indeterminate and vague. This indeter-
minacy and vagueness make it theoretically and empirically frustrating
and incomplete. To resolve this problem, obviously, the dilemma itself
(i. e., the choice between randomness or residual indeterminacy) must
be transcended; this can come about, however, only if the formal ad-
herence to individualism is abandoned (224225).
The fact that phenomenology and interactionism have not followed that
last option is demonstrated in the remainder of Alexander’s essay. He
goes into considerable detail to show that both traditions have eventually
developed radical individualist positions in Harold Garfinkel and Her-
bert Blumer, respectively. Their followers, Alexander notes, have been
caught within the individualist dilemma ever since (254).
Not having read the original essay, one could have the impression that
Alexander wished to do away with ‘individualist sociology’ in favor of
the collectivist stance he himself advocates. However, this is not the case,
for he makes a clear distinction between the presuppositions in regard
to social order on the one hand, and doing empirical research on the
other. Whereas he holds that the collectivist perspective is the sole basis
for a general framework for social theory, empirical research of interac-
tion between individuals “should incorporate whenever possible the em-
pirical insight of individualistic theories into the concrete operations,
structures, and processes of the empirical interactions of concrete individ-
uals” (225). There is, after all, no inherent contradiction between the asser-
tion that only individuals are capable of autonomous actions, and the sim-
ultaneous assertion that the results of these actions have ‘emergent’ prop-
erties which cannot be traced back to the intentions of individual actors
(Alexander and Giesen, 1987: 20; see also Coleman, 1990).
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This is roughly the perspective I want to advocate here. In both phe-
nomenology and symbolic interactionism, action is said to spring from
the individual consciousness of the actor, who interprets his environment
(including other actors, human artifacts, social institutions, cultural sym-
bol systems, etc.) and decides to act on the basis of this interpretation.
In this perspective, the social environment affects the situation only
through the conscious elaboration of the actor(s). Although this may be
a useful guiding principle for conducting empirical research, I want to
argue that this proposition cannot be held on to if the development of a
social theory is what is aimed at. The purpose, however, is not only to
elaborate upon Alexander’s remarks by showing that it is the stress
placed on the actor’s individual consciousness in both phenomenology
and symbolic interactionism that prevents either approach from being
able to conceptualize the ‘collective moment’ in social action (see the
next two sections). Next, I will demonstrate a ‘way out’ by showing
what can be gained for action theory by seriously considering some of
Luhmann’s remarks about the relationship between consciousness and
communication in social life. By distinguishing consciousness and com-
munication as two separate but interdependent systems, the first termed
‘psychic system’ and the second ‘social system’, Luhmann offers an alter-
native perspective that, in my view, deserves being incorporated into
action theory. What this means for the study of human action in general
and for social action approaches in mass communications research in
particular is sketched in the conclusion.
Phenomenological sociology: The foundation of action in the stream
of consciousness
If there is to be a founding father for the phenomenological branch in
sociology, it must be Alfred Schütz (1974) with his classic Der sinnhafte
Aufbau der sozialen Welt, which was first published in Vienna in 1932.1
Schütz sets out to provide Weberian action theory with a phenomenolog-
ical foundation. He first criticizes Weber for not having properly defined
what is meant by the central category Sinn (meaning2) in his methodol-
ogy, except that the meaning and the motive for an action appear to be
synonymous (Schütz, 1974: 27). Weber (1984) analyzed the interconnec-
tedness of human social actions in terms of means and ends, and posited
that social actions can only be explained (in a second instance) after they
have been interpreted (‘verstanden’) by the researcher in terms of the
subjective meanings the actor(s) attach to it. In doing so, he instated
individual consciousness in theory as the empirical locus of control in
human social action. Schütz, referring to the work of the philosopher
Edmund Husserl, replaces Weber’s means-ends-rationality by a phenom-
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enological analysis of what goes on in the consciousness of the actor
while acting. Consciousness directs its attention to itself by synthesizing
actual experience with past and future Bewusstseinserlebnisse. This syn-
thesis, Sinnzusammenhang (meaning context), provides the basis for pro-
jecting accomplished actions in the future. By visualizing a future state
in which this action shall be accomplished, the actor mentally develops
a project of his action, which, in Schütz’ view, must be seen as the actual
Sinn of his action (Schütz, 1974: 126).
In a next step, still firmly founding his analysis on strict Husserlian
reasoning, Schütz explains how one consciousness can have access to
the Bewusstseinserlebnisse of another. Here, he falls back on ‘mundane’
experiences of actors living in the ‘natural attitude’ (137 ff.; see also
Schütz and Luckmann, 1979, 1984). In everyday life, as an actor I only
experience segments of another actor’s stream of consciousness through
my observations of his/her conduct and utterances, since most of the
time I subsume my experiences of the other’s conduct in objective mean-
ing contexts. That is, I only consider this actor’s finished meaning
contexts, not the meaning-giving process that has led to them (187 ff.).
In order to interpret the other’s actions, therefore, I only require access
to my own inner consciousness.
It is clear that Schütz, like Husserl, analyzes the social world strictly
through the acts of consciousness of individual actors. References to
social categories such as ‘social environment’, ‘social relationships’ and
the like are made as if they can solely ‘exist’ through the eyes of individ-
uals, the indivisible particles (‘atoms’) of social science. Also, the emer-
gence of patterned conduct in society is seen in terms of a reduction of
psychic complexity, of freeing the individual from the burden of having
to choose each time anew how to behave in similar situations (see,
following Schütz in this respect, Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 5051).
The collectivist moment, in Alexander’s terms, is continually mediated
by individual consciousnesses. A prime example of the problems the the-
ory runs into is tied to the concept of institutionalization as advocated
by Berger and Luckmann (1966). In an attempt to overcompensate for
the freedom that action phenomenology bestows upon individual actors,
these authors tend to attach positive value to institutionalization pro-
cesses and the mutual integration of institutions. The opposite process,
segregation, is valued rather negatively. But for the sociological observer,
segregation of institutions is as much a phenomenon to be valued as is
integration (Huysmans, 2001: 40).3 In short, due to the problems phe-
nomenological sociology runs into because of its individualist proposi-
tions, it has a tendency to theoretically ‘constrict’ individual freedom too
tightly in order to arrive at explaining the relatively orderly state most
social systems find themselves in. The same, in my view, is true for sym-
bolic interactionism.
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Symbolic interactionism: Definition of the situation and joint action
As a branch of sociology under this heading, symbolic interactionism
has established itself mainly through the collection of essays by Herbert
Blumer, entitled Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (1986).
The most prominent essays are very programmatic in character, trying
to convince the sociological observer that the first thing (s)he should do
is get in touch with empirical reality (3334). Blumer draws heavily on
work done in the Chicago School of sociology, in particular the work of
George Herbert Mead. In Blumer’s view, sociology has been too much
concerned with describing the “large parts or aspects” of society  insti-
tutions, classes, organizations, corporations  in terms of “system prin-
ciples”. Human actors are seen as mere “media for the play and expres-
sion of the forces or mechanisms of the system”. Instead, Blumer pro-
poses to analyze what happens in social systems “in terms of the process
of interpretation engaged in by the acting participants as they handle
the situations at their respective positions in the organization” (5758).
The point of departure in his analysis is the definition of the situation.
An acting individual needs to interpret his immediate environment, give
meaning to selected objects in that environment, and construct a line of
action before being able, indeed, to act. ‘Joint or collective action’, as
this takes place in groups and organizations, relies on the same principle,
even if the outcome of the fitting together of individual actions takes a
direction unforeseen  if not unwanted  by either participant. What
prevents joint action from getting out of hand is that participants have
the capacity to reflect on their own actions in terms of how their counter-
parts interpret their behavior. They have developed an identity through
repeatedly seeing their own actions through the eyes of others. By being
able to evaluate one’s own conduct from an outer position, both interac-
tants can consciously control their actions and thereby arrive at a ‘joint’
action (cf. Mead, 1967: 73 f.; Blumer, 1986: 111).
This point of view about the ‘nature of human action’ is extended to
social science methodology: “one has to get inside of the defining process
of the actor in order to understand his action” (Blumer, 1986: 16). It is
there, as I have laid out elsewhere (Huysmans, 2001: 4243) that Blumer
starts to confuse his theoretical and methodological positions in speak-
ing about the nature and observation of ‘joint actions’. First, he states
that theoretically joint actions have a dynamic of their own, which is
more than the sum total of multiple intertwining lines of action. So,
in this stage of his analysis an organizational principle is put forward.
Methodologically, the researcher who studies these joint actions is ad-
vised to seek contact with the interacting individuals in order to get a
grasp on their respective definitions of the situation, which “yields a
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picture of the organized complex” of their joint action (Blumer, 1986:
58). Yet in a further, superfluous and erroneous step Blumer uses his
methodological dictum as an argument against theorizing joint actions
in terms of organizational or system principles (e. g., 59). This contra-
dicts his own position. But there is no inherent contradiction in both
theorizing joint actions as having a dynamic of their own and studying
its emergence as such from the standpoints of the interacting individuals
(Alexander and Giesen, 1987: 20; cf. Alexander, 1988). Multiple variants
of the prisoner’s dilemma, in which the amount of communication be-
tween the participants was varied, serve as a good case in point (cf.
Sears, Freedman, and Peplau, 1985: 363367). Like in phenomenologi-
cal sociology, the idea that each action arises out of conscious consider-
ation and sense making in each situation serves as a too restrictive
argument against theorizing social collectivities as having a dynamic of
their own, a dynamic which provides boundaries for individual meaning-
giving. The point Blumer wants to make is that “the organization of a
human society is the framework inside of which social action takes place
and is not the determinant of that action. … Such organization and
changes in it are the product of the activity of acting units and not of
‘forces’ which leave such acting units out of account” (Blumer, 1986:
87). Here, Blumer uses an old rhetorical trick; painting a caricature of
the opponent’s (i. e., ‘mainstream’ sociology’s) position in order to make
your own position look more acceptable. In doing so, however, he ties
symbolic interactionism too tightly to an anti-collectivist stance. When-
ever he speaks of social collectivities (like families, schools, churches),
those collectivities are seen as if they were individual ‘acting units’. The
actions of these ‘units’ are subject to the same situation definition and
project-developing principles as are the actions of individuals.
Despite claiming that each collectivity in the last resort consists of
acting individuals, Blumer fails to describe how a collectivity succeeds
in demarcating itself from its social environment and recognizes itself as
such. What is more, no distinction is made between an insider’s and the
outsiders’ views on the identity of the group. A social group’s definition
of itself may be wholly different from the definition the outside world
has of it (which is the case in individual identity formation as well). Since
social attributions of identity are a main source of social conflict, this is
a serious drawback of Blumer’s theoretical position. A social scientist
trying to account for diverging identity attributions does not find, in
symbolic interactionism, the tools with which to construct a social theory
that takes social mechanisms like these into account.
In stating that the social world and the meaning-giving processes ta-
king place within it arise from individual consciousness exclusively, and
have to be dealt with accordingly in a methodological sense, symbolic
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interactionism has foresaken the potential of Mead’s pragmatic sociol-
ogy. As Alexander (1988: 251252) puts it: “Whereas Mead usually,
though not always, spoke of meaning as the product of an unconscious
attitudinal specification of general cultural patterns, (…) Blumer’s indi-
vidual is given incredible control over the meaning of his acts  a con-
trol contested only by the presence of other, equally separated selves.”4
How far the twain have drifted apart gets clear, perhaps surprisingly,
when Blumer’s work is confronted with systems theory.
Systems theory: Human action as communicative attribution
As I have tried to demonstrate in the previous sections, both phenome-
nological sociology and symbolic interactionism have analyzed human
action and meaning-giving from the standpoint of individual ‘subjective
consciousness’. Either approach uses the ‘last resort’ argument to argue
against collectivism, by on the one hand acknowledging that supra-indi-
vidual categories like social structures and culture are important, but on
the other hand maintaining that ‘in the last resort’ it is the individual
who reproduces these categories in his actions. What is striking is that
this has been the case whilst there was an inherent necessity in neither
approach to take a polemicist attitude against collectivist positions.5
Nevertheless, the ‘last resort’ argument, convincing though it may
seem, has unduly prevented action theory from paying attention to the
analysis of social collectives. For it is one thing to say that every collec-
tive arises from the situation definitions of actors engaged in joint action,
but quite another to arrive at descriptions, let alone explanations, for
collective behavior. An important thing to recognize is that the objects
an actor finds present in the situation in which he is about to act are
contingent upon the actions of others. Therefore, his definition of the
situation depends, to a considerable extent, upon the definitions of his
co-actors in that situation. Blumer has tried to take this insecurity into
account in his description of the ‘joint action’ (1986: 109110). But in-
stead of first analyzing the problem, he immediately proceeds to its solu-
tion by mentioning the social character of definition schemes and the
self-reflexivity each actor brings to the situation. Talcott Parsons, whose
ideas are strongly opposed by Blumer, instead stresses the inherent inse-
curity in interaction situations with his description of the double contin-
gency problem:
The concept of interaction is the first-order step beyond the action
concept itself toward formulating the concept of social system. (…)
The crucial reference points for analyzing interaction are two: (1) that
each actor is both acting agent and object of orientation both to him-
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self and to the others; and (2) that, as acting agent, he orients to
himself and to others and, as object, has meaning to himself and to
others, in all of the primary modes or aspects. (…) From these prem-
ises derives the fundamental proposition of the double contingency of
interaction. Not only, as for isolated behaving units, animal or human,
is a goal outcome contingent on successful cognition and manipulation
of environmental objects by the actors, but since the most important ob-
jects involved in interaction act too, it is also contingent on their action
or intervention in the course of events (Parsons, 1968: 436).
The inherent instability of the interaction situation leads in Parsons’s
eyes to the genesis of a social system. According to Luhmann6 (1995:
103 ff.; 1984: 148 ff.), however, the solution Parsons brings to bear on
the double contingency problem  the presence of a normative orienta-
tion in both interactants with the mutual assumption of consensus 
already goes too far. Luhmann states that this normative orientation
compensating for the mutual insecurity should not have been built, like
Parsons did, into the concept of double contingency. Rather, Luhmann
sees double contingency  “empty, closed, indeterminable self-reference”
(Luhmann, 1995: 105; 1984: 151) as generating its own solution. In a
situation of utter indeterminacy everything that happens has structuring
value for the things to happen next. After an initial step by one of the
interacting participants, every following step reduces complexity and
thereby has determining value.
Combining concepts from Parsons’s theory, general systems theory,
Weber’s categories of verstehende sociology, Husserlian phenomenology
and Mead’s pragmatism, Luhmann composes an abstract but at the same
time illuminating perspective on the social world. The fundamental re-
newal Luhmann brings to social theory is that the double contingency
problem, which arises in every situation in which two consciousnesses 
mutually intransparent ‘black boxes’, or psychic systems as Luhmann
terms them  meet, leads to the building of a social system which is
nothing more or less than communication, a self-referent network in
which one communication follows another. Communication, in Luh-
mann’s view, is not something that emerges from consciousness. People
are not speaking their minds, translating their thoughts into words in
what is called ‘communicative action’, like Habermas (1987) would have
it (see Luhmann, 1995: 138; 1984: 192). Rather, both consciousness and
communication should be seen as self-determining and self-referent
wholes on the basis of meaning (Sinn). And subsequently, meaning is
described as a phenomenon not exclusively restricted to the operations
of consciousness. This is a decisive break with the phenomenological
tradition of Husserl (Luhmann, 1995: 512; 1984: 93; cf. Kneer and Nas-
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sehi, 1993: 76) with far-reaching consequences. Meaning refers to the
ever-present difference, not only in psychological experience but also in
communication, between what is actually present and what is temporar-
ily pushed into the background of attention. As meaning-based entities,
psychic and social systems are mutually dependent upon each other; i. e.,
communication ‘irritates’ consciousness and vice versa. But they cannot
interfere in each other’s operations. It is precisely because of the mutual
non-transparency of consciousnesses that communication comes about
as a kind of ‘compensation’.
It may not be clear from this brief sketch what is gained by such an
abstract perspective on communication and consciousness. Nor may it
be clear what it means for the conceptualization of human action, but I
will turn to that now. In my view, Luhmann provides rather thought-
provoking arguments, which should at least be reflected upon by action
theorists. Already in 1971, in a discussion with Habermas, he argued
that if ‘meaning’ is to be taken seriously as the basic concept of sociol-
ogy, social (and psychic) systems cannot ‘exist’ outside of meaning (Luh-
mann, 1971a: 1112). The boundaries of society are meaning-consti-
tuted boundaries and not of a physical or territorial nature. This is not
to say that physical or territorial boundaries are irrelevant, but it does
say that they are not ‘part of’ the system. Another implication is that a
social system does not consist of human beings. Instead, as has already
been said, social systems consist only of communications, and psychic
systems consist of thoughts. In these networks of mutually referring
thoughts and communications human beings are observed at most as
entities in their environment. Meaning, as a concept, is to be defined
prior to the subject concept, as the last necessarily presupposes the first
(Luhmann, 1971b: 28). In action theory, where meaning is seen to spring
from the consciousness of the subject, it is the other way around.
The implications of this for the conceptualization of human action
can be sensed now. Action is to be seen as a meaningful attribution of
conduct to a system, be it a social system (as in utterances like ‘the police
have taken precautionary measures’ or ‘my family has always been trav-
elling a lot’) or a psychic system (‘I have made good progress in my
work today’; ‘you shouldn’t have brought me flowers’). There is always
a potential difference  and here a strong point of Luhmann’s theory
comes to the forefront  between self-attribution of actions by a system
and the attribution(s) to that system by other systems. For instance, one
can be pleased by one’s performance (‘I have done all I could to get the
job finished today’), whereas others may be not (‘Why is he leaving the
office already, can’t he work late for once?’). It is this difference in attri-
bution that accounts for much of social dynamics. If one confronts it
with the way phenomenology and symbolic interactionism conceive of
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human actions, it can be seen that judging human social action from
each actor’s intentions leaves out the double contingency inherent in
interaction. One can easily surmise that the dissimilarity of perspectives
can be socially important, and even decisive, in juridical communication.
What counts most in terms of the social consequences is not whether the
suspect actually intended to kill the victim, or has actually committed the
crime, but rather whether the judge or the jury deems it proven beyond
reasonable doubt that this was the case and passes the according judge-
ment (see Schneider, 1994). I will return to this briefly in the next section.
What strikes one is that Luhmann distances himself from a long tradi-
tion in sociology from Weber via Parsons to various strands of modern
action theory, which sees society as consisting of social actions, or hu-
man beings. Social systems are no longer seen as the products of human
action. It is the other way around: “Sociality is not a special case of
action; instead, action is constituted in social systems by means of com-
munication and attribution as a reduction of complexity, as an indis-
pensable self-simplification of the system” (Luhmann, 1995: 137; 1984:
191). That such a position will not be endorsed by symbolic interaction-
ism is clear;7 it is, however, closer to Mead’s thinking than many a sym-
bolic interactionist is willing to concede (cf. Nassehi, 1993: 243).
Conclusion: Action theory between individualism and collectivism
From the previous sections, one might have gained the impression that
a substitution of action theory by systems theory is advocated here. My
point is, however, more subtle than that. The question that will be an-
swered in this concluding section is: what can action theory gain by a
reflection on the criticisms that Luhmann brings to bear? A general an-
swer to that question would be: it can correct assumptions which have
been too one-sidedly individualistic, and thereby draw on the useful con-
tributions of phenomenology (Schütz) and pragmatism (Mead) to social
theory without incorporating the theoretical flaws added by either’s suc-
cessors.
Luhmann makes a very solid point in criticizing subjectivist theories,
which start with the subject and from there try to get a grasp of what
ties these subjects together. ‘Intersubjectivity’, in his view, is a formula
which is introduced the moment one tries to stick to the subjectivity of
consciousness and introduces something which cannot be conceived of
in this theory. The ‘inter’ contradicts the ‘subject’, or rather each subject
has its own intersubjectivity (Luhmann, 1986a: 42; see also 1995: 81, 146
[1984: 120, 202]; 1997: 10271032). If one allows communication to be
conceived of as a system organizing itself outside of consciousness, this
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does not mean, as is often claimed (for instance by Blumer), that the
acting subject is determined from the outside, by the system. Even the
opposite can be said to be the case; i. e., because human beings are seen
not as the building blocks of society, but as objects in the environment of
society, they have more freedom in their actions, particularly more free-
dom to act irrationally and immorally (cf. 1995: 212213; 1984: 289).
Communication, after all, cannot take part in the operations of con-
sciousness, and thus can never tell consciousnesses what to think.
Communication, on the other hand, is more free to develop its own
dynamics. This is more in line with the common knowledge that once a
conflict between two or more people has started, it is very hard to con-
trol its course. Luhmann’s elaboration on social conflict, in my view,
serves as a case in point of the productivity of this perspective (1995,
1984, chapter 9).
Furthermore, the point Luhmann makes about the Sinngrenzen (mean-
ing-constituted boundaries) of consciousness and communication should
be taken seriously both in action theory and in its methodology. Whereas
in action theory the actual performance of the preconceived act in the
outer world tends to occupy a central place in the theory and these acts
are analyzed accordingly in research (as ‘physical entities’ so to speak),
this view is contested in systems theory. Everything that takes place in
social systems (in communication) does so in the form of meaning. This
is not to say that meaning would never refer to actual ‘things out there’.
Of course, we do move our bodies when we go shopping, and we feel
our vocal cords as we speak. There is a world out there, but for social
and psychic systems it only ‘exists’ in meaningful reference. An implica-
tion of this for empirical research is that actions should be analyzed
according to the theoretical scheme; i. e., as communicative or conscious
attributions. In the past decade, a discussion has been going on in Ger-
man sociology about the methodological implications of systems theoret-
ical thought which reconceptualizes Weber’s ‘Sinnverstehen’ and applies
it to the analysis of communication protocols (see Kneer and Nassehi,
1991; Nassehi, 1997; Schneider, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997; Sutter, 1999; cf.
Luhmann, 1986b) with illuminating results. The consciousness of the
actor is no longer seen as the primary or single source of meaning attri-
bution. The meaning of an action is constituted instead as a synthesis of
self- and foreign attribution, and the potential difference between the
two can be made productive (Schneider, 1994: 267).
Thus, action theoretical approaches in mass communications research
(see Anderson and Meyer, 1988; Charlton and Neumann, 1986; Renck-
storf, 1989, 1994; Renckstorf, McQuail, and Jankowski, 1996; Renck-
storf and Wester, 1992; Schoening and Anderson, 1995) could develop a
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more detailed perspective on the position of the mass media as a societal
subsystem (Luhmann, 1996). Describing the mass media as (a) social
system(s) is one thing (see for instance Renckstorf, 1994: 38), it is quite
another to explain their functioning from the situation definitions of the
actors involved, as action theory would have it. A more productive posi-
tion would be, in my view, to conceive of the mass media as a societal
subsystem, without downplaying the contribution of individual actors to
its functioning (see Scholl and Weischenberg, 1998; Huysmans, 2002).
This enables one to study the media supply and demand sides in one
overarching theoretical framework, which allows for human conscious-
ness to observe reality, but for the mass media as a social system as well.
As was the case in the study of juridical communication, the dissimilarity
of perspectives between the media themselves, between media and their
users, and between media users themselves, could be rendered productive
in a more ‘holistic’ approach (see Früh 1991) to media use research.
Notes
1. The English translation is entitled The phenomenology of the social world (1967).
2. A problematic translation, since the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung in
German is blurred. A more apt translation, in my view, would be sense. I will use
meaning nevertheless in conformity to common practice in social science.
3. Another example of the underdeterminedness of social categories in Schütz’ work
is the concept of ‘social time’. The concept pops up every now and then (for
example in Schütz and Luckmann, 1979, 1984) without being clarified. In Schütz
(1982: 224) a conceptualization is announced, but the manuscript ends before the
promise is redeemed. Nassehi (1993) concludes that social structures, and the so-
cial time category in particular, remain ‘underdefined’ in Schütz (see also Huys-
mans, 2001: 7175).
4. The same point of criticism on Blumer’s “misinterpretation of Mead” (Alexander,
1988, p. 253) is made by Hans Joas in his dissertation Praktische Intersubjektivität
(Joas, 1989: 12), who attributes the ‘enormous divergences’ between symbolic in-
teractionism and Mead’s work to ‘an extremely fragmentary reception’ of Mead’s
work by Blumer.
5. “When we look at the most sophisticated and most successful strands of phenome-
nology and interactionism, we see that they were not intended to be epistemologi-
cal and ontological confrontations with theories that posit supraindividual order;
rather, they were intended to give greater urgency to an empirical aspect of order
that has been neglected by most such collectivist theories, at least post-Hegel: the
relationship between the prior, supraindividual order and the moment-to-moment
unfolding of real historical time. The relations between order and contingency,
these traditions have argued, can be illuminated only by a more detailed empirical
understanding of the processes of individual consciousness” (Alexander, 1988:
253254).
6. Luhmann’s Soziale Systeme, Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (1984) will be
cited here both in the original German version and in the English translation
(1995).
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7. “ ‘Symbolic interactionism’ (…) builds a contingently acting alter ego into the ego
and sees, quite correctly, the process of mediation as the use of symbols. But it
treats the problem only on one side of the interaction, assuming that all is the
same on the other. It treats, so to speak, only half of double contingency and
thereby remains a theory of action. Social systems emerge, however, through (and
only through) the fact that both partners experience double contingency and that
the indeterminability of such a situation for both partners in any activity that then
takes place possesses significance for the formation of structures. This cannot be
grasped via the basic concept of action” (Luhmann, 1995: 108; 1984: 154).
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